Roudha Alshaer Alaleeli
Abstract
Over the last decade and a half, the UAE has worked to become a global destination for culture and tourism. One of the reasons given for the UAE’s efforts is to develop its soft power. However, it is rather unclear what effects the focus on tourism and cultural attractions has had on soft power. The current paper attempts to understand how cultural diplomacy initiatives and tourism events contribute to the UAE’s soft power in terms of diplomatic engagement and international perception. The paper made use of case study methodology and extensive data collection to evaluate the impact on the UAE’s soft power due to tourism and cultural activities. After reviewing extensive literature and primary sources, the paper found that investments in cultural diplomacy and large-scale tourism events bolster the UAE’s soft power by adding legitimacy to the UAE’s image, creating opportunities for global partnerships, and improving cultural exchange. Art museums, such as the Louvre Abu Dhabi, particularly promote the UAE’s image and cultural capital by placing the country at the center of the regional art landscape. Tourism events promote the image of the UAE as a tolerant and diverse nation, which has served to counter criticism towards human rights. Sports events and investments further serve to promote diplomatic relations and a positive image globally. International education institutions also promote the image of the UAE as a hub of learning, research, and innovation. Overall, the various tourism and cultural diplomacy initiatives are seen to have improved the UAE’s reputation and, subsequently, its soft power.
Keywords: Soft Power, Cultural Diplomacy, Art Museums, Diplomatic Engagement, International Branding.
Introduction
From a barren desert landscape, the UAE has transformed itself into a global tourist and cultural destination. With towering skyscrapers and mega-projects on one hand and international art museums and exhibitions on the other, the UAE continues to work on initiatives to make it stand out as a tourist and cultural destination. However, the question remains whether such initiatives have benefited the UAE’s soft power strategy. To this extent, the research paper aims to assess how cultural diplomacy initiatives and tourism events contribute to the UAE’s soft power, particularly in terms of diplomatic engagement and international perception. This paper argues that the UAE strategically leverages cultural diplomacy—through arts, tourism, sports, and education—as a key tool to enhance its soft power, elevating its international profile and forging stronger diplomatic and global partnerships. The research paper provides a uniquely constructivist perspective on the relationship between the UAE’s soft power and cultural diplomacy initiatives. Constructivism allows for an ideal understanding of how ideas, norms, and identities—influenced by tourism and culture—impact international relations. Additionally, the paper also focuses on how the various efforts by the UAE influence the forces of globalization to the state’s benefit (Ulrichsen, 2016).[1] The primary finding from the paper is that tourism and cultural diplomacy initiatives have enhanced UAE’s soft power by improving its brand image and reputation.
Theory
The last decade and a half has seen a dramatic shift in the UAE’s foreign policy strategy. From its independence till the mid-2000s, the UAE’s foreign policy largely reflected western interests in the region. However, the UAE has shifted to adopting a more proactive stance in regional and international affairs (Krzymowski, 2022).[2] In particular, the UAE has used network effects, leveraging its status as a major oil producer and an international commercial hub, to establish itself as a dominant regional player (Mason, 2018).[3] The UAE’s participation and leadership in the recent Abraham Accords with Israel reflects the UAE’s more proactive foreign policy stance. In asserting itself internationally, the UAE has not restricted itself to simply economic, political, and military measures. The UAE has been undertaking significant efforts to promote its soft power. For instance, the UAE has invested heavily in philanthropic and developmental initiatives in both developed and developing nations (Krzymowski, 2018).[4] Predominantly, however, the UAE has sought to promote its soft power by positioning itself as a tourism destination via mega-events and also as a center of culture and heritage (Ang, Isar, and Mar, 2015).[5]
In order to gain a closer understanding of the UAE’s soft power initiatives, it is important to understand the concepts of soft power, cultural diplomacy, and tourism promotion. Soft power and hard power are categorizations of a state’s power developed by Joseph Nye. Hard power refers to the military and economic power of a state that allows it to coerce or influence states in international affairs. Soft power, on the other hand, refers to “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments (Figueira, 2016).”[6] For instance, across the world, the United States directly finances the Voice of America program, which gives insights into American culture and life. The result is that people are able to humanize the United States as a state, which subsequently influences how states deal with the United States (Ang et al., 2015).[7] Cultural diplomacy and tourism diplomacy are techniques of soft power. Ang, Isar and Mar define cultural diplomacy as “a governmental practice that operates in the name of a clearly defined ethos of national or local representation, in a space where nationalism and internationalism merge (Ang, Isar, and Mar, 2015).”[8] To put it simply, when the local culture is presented to an international audience via state sponsorship, cultural diplomacy is undertaken. The concept of tourism promotion refers to engaging in nation branding or destination branding to attract inbound international tourism (Ang, Isar, and Mar, 2015).[9]
Methods
Research Methodology
For the purpose of the current research, the case study methodology is used. The case study methodology was used primarily for two reasons: (1) the effects of cultural diplomacy on soft power vary from state to state and are difficult to quantify, and (2) the case study methodology allows for a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding that better informs policy decisions. The case study focused on the United Arab Emirates, particularly from 2008 and after.
The impact of cultural diplomacy—or, for that matter, any initiative to build soft power—can have different effects in different states. Orientalist or stereotypical views of a state can particularly stunt the influence of cultural diplomacy. For instance, the recent FIFA World Cup in Qatar constantly brought attention to Qatar’s poor treatment of menial labor and similarly poor human rights record (Dubinsky, 2023).[10] These criticisms were overexaggerated as the death toll of migrants misrepresented migrants directly working on World Cup projects. Rather than cultural diplomacy strengthening soft power, cultural diplomacy weakened Qatar’s soft power. However, other nations have improved their soft power by hosting sporting events. Apart from the effects of cultural diplomacy varying from state to state, the effects of cultural diplomacy on soft power are hard to quantify. Unlike hard power, which can be quantified in terms of military strength or economic resources, soft power is a more intangible concept and difficult to quantify (Hall, 2010).[11] Whereas a few soft power indexes exist, a cursory web search found that many are behind pay walls, and two of the indexes had two-year-old information. Given the UAE’s soft power initiatives When a phenomenon’s effects vary and the phenomenon is difficult to quantify, a case study methodology is appropriate (Lamont, 2022).[12]
With respect to the research’s topic, the case study methodology is also more appropriate as it allows for a more nuanced understanding. The case study methodology – as would be discussed shortly – does not restrict the researcher to particular sources of data (Lamont, 2022).[13] As all available information can be utilized in understanding the topic, a better understanding can be achieved. With respect to the current topic, the use of all sources of data means that the effects of cultural diplomacy may not only be understood from increase in the UAE’s brand image but also on the UAE’s diplomatic engagements, foreign direct investment, tourism inflows and all other relevant variables. The use of all possible data would allow for a nuanced understanding. In matters of policy, where changes could have far-reaching real-life consequences, it is better to have a nuanced understanding rather than a generalized understanding.
Research Methods
As mentioned earlier, a primary benefit of the case study methodology is that multiple research methods can be utilized. Indeed, the current research makes use of both primary and secondary sources to explore the effects of UAE’s cultural diplomacy on its soft power. The primary sources used in the paper include policy documents, statements by government officials (both local and foreign officials), statistics on tourism, and surveys on participants of cultural diplomacy events. The primary sources are analyzed primarily via content analysis and critical examination. In particular, the statements and claims made in the primary sources are evaluated against the information presented in the secondary sources to better contextualize the claims.
The research also makes extensive use of secondary sources. A significant amount of research has already been done on the UAE’s cultural diplomacy efforts. The theory section already outlined some of the secondary sources. For the secondary data, most of the sources used are from peer-reviewed journal articles and academic books. However, as the UAE’s cultural diplomacy efforts are ongoing, secondary data from newspaper articles, white papers and NGO reports might also be used. In selecting secondary sources, significant emphasis is placed on the credibility and authenticity of the publication and the author. The secondary data extracted from secondary sources is analyzed using content analysis and discourse analysis, similar to the analysis of primary sources. The aim is to ensure that information is contextualized and a nuanced understanding of the UAE’s cultural diplomacy efforts is realized.
Analysis
A Primer on Emirati Cultural Diplomacy
The UAE has undertaken a diverse number of cultural diplomacy initiatives to promote its soft power. Broadly speaking, these can be classified into four categories: arts and culture, sports, tourism, and education (Antwi-Boateng and Alhashmi, 2022) (see Figure 1).[14] Amongst these four categories, the UAE—in particular, the Emirate of Dubai—initially invested significantly in developing luxury and shopping tourism. Over the last fifteen years, the UAE has also increasingly focused on developing cultural tourism to promote both the local Emirati culture and also to emphasize on the diversity that exists within the UAE. The UAE has also become host to a number of regular sporting events, such as the Abu Dhabi Grand Prix (Formula 1), the DP World Tour (Golf), and the Dubai DTF Tennis Championship (Tennis) (Gołębiowski, 2020).[15] Apart from recreational and cultural activities, the UAE has also engaged in cultural diplomacy by developing itself as a center for higher education in the region. The UAE also hosts top-ranked universities in the region, such as the American University of Sharjah.
Figure 1 – Examples of UAE’s Cultural Diplomacy Actions
Whereas the above examples might indicate decades of focus on cultural diplomacy, the UAE only recently formalized its cultural diplomacy function and soft power strategy. The impetus to develop its soft power started in 2004, when His Highness Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al-Nahyan passed away. The new leadership took on a more assertive global approach contrary to Sheikh Zayed’s mild bandwagoning Arab-focused approach (Kamrava, 2018).[16] Further impetus to develop soft power came in 2008, when the Global Financial Crisis saw a huge spike in oil prices, which saw a substantial increase in the UAE’s economic resources (Ulrichsen, 2016).[17] A major impetus to develop soft power has also been a shift in US foreign policy from the Middle East to Asia. The shift to Asia makes it necessary for the USA’s Middle Eastern allies not only to accrue soft and hard power to secure themselves but also to re-align with Asia themselves (Shahrour, 2020).[18]
All of the aforementioned factors eventually resulted in the UAE formalizing its soft power strategy that had been building up since 2008. The UAE established its Soft Power Council in 2017, and subsequently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the Office for Public and Cultural Diplomacy in 2018 (Engelland-Gay, 2023).[19] Since the establishment of the Soft Power Council, the UAE has worked to promote its local heritage (through the Year of Zayed in 2018) and its reputation as a tolerant state (through the Year of Tolerance in 2019). Regardless of when the UAE formalized its cultural diplomacy function, the UAE’s actions in the past with respect to cultural diplomacy have been clearly designed to promote its influence and reputation. In order to illustrate how the UAE’s cultural diplomacy investments affect its soft power, an analysis of different types of cultural diplomacy actions is presented below. The analysis primarily illustrates that despite some adverse effects, the UAE has grown its soft power from the various cultural diplomacy activities it has invested in over the last decade and a half.
Promoting Arts and Culture
The UAE has undertaken a wide number of actions with respect to promoting itself as a center for arts and culture. With respect to culture specifically, the UAE currently houses numerous museums and almost every Emirate has its own museums (Engelland-Gay, 2023).[20] However, no other cultural project in the UAE has received as much attention as the Louvre Abu Dhabi. The Louvre Abu Dhabi not only positions the UAE as a cultural hub but also strengthens its soft power by associating the country with globally recognized institutions, enhancing its cultural legitimacy and international influence. The actual Louvre in France holds quite historical and cultural significance (Ajana, 2015).[21] Not only does the Louvre possess many of the world’s most prized art pieces but it is also strongly associated with the establishment of the modern French nation-state. The process of entering an agreement with the Louvre began in 2006 and was part of developing Sadiyat Island in Abu Dhabi as a cultural destination (De Corte, 2019).[22] After protracted negotiations, a deal was signed in 2007 with facilitation from the French government. As per the agreement, the UAE will be allowed to use the name of Louvre for thirty years and the Louvre would also provide art pieces to Louvre Abu Dhabi until it purchases its own collection. The Louvre Abu Dhabi opened in 2017 in an event attended by the French President and many international dignitaries. At the time of its opening, the French President gave a speech and said about the museum that “beauty will save the world” (Langtown, 2017).[23] Since the museum’s opening, the Louvre Abu Dhabi has attracted an average of one million visitors per year.
In academic literature, significant attention has been paid to the soft power contributions of the Louvre Abu Dhabi. De Corte writes about the Louvre Abu Dhabi as primarily a soft power tool of the French, but mentions that the Louvre Abu Dhabi provides a unique forum for both France and the UAE to engage in relationship-building (De Corte, 2019).[24] Eldean observes that the Louvre Abu Dhabi is the region’s first universal museum and in this capacity it provides room for cultural dialogue between the East and the West (Sharaf Eldean, 2021).[25] Ajana, while not specifically discussing soft power, provides the most extensive insights into how Louvre Abu Dhabi builds the UAE’s soft power via legitimation (Ajana, 2015).[26] Building upon the concept of cultural capital by Pierre Bourdieu, Ajana argues that for any person, institution or nation to develop legitimacy they need cultural capital along with economic capital. However, cultural capital is difficult to acquire as it generally comes from long processes of accumulation. The Louvre is a significant piece of cultural capital for France that sets its hierarchy in the international community. In lending the Louvre name, the UAE is able to draw on this cultural capital to enhance its own cultural legitimacy. The Louvre identity provides the Sadiyat cultural project with instant brand value. The legitimation effects of the Louvre Abu Dhabi cannot be discounted as Louvre Abu Dhabi attracts millions every year.
While Louvre Abu Dhabi has improved the UAE’s image as a cultural destination, the impact on its soft power is not as clear. Nardone provides a thorough assessment of the soft power effects of the Louvre Abu Dhabi and observes that the Louvre Abu Dhabi has provided the UAE with significant reputation and influence, particularly in France (Nardone, 2018).[27] Nardone indicates the success of the Louvre Abu Dhabi as a soft power tool by listing out the extensive collaboration between France and the UAE following the Louvre agreement. However, Nardone also observes that the project has been criticized from many prominent artists, which can hinder the soft power benefits for the UAE. Regardless, Nardone does acknowledge that the Louvre Abu Dhabi allows “the nation to engage in cronyism with Western european elites” which ultimately leads to greater influence in international relations. Nisbett also indicates as much in her commentary on soft power in the UAE (Nisbett, 2021).[28] While acknowledging the lack of human rights abuse that she has been informed of in her own ethnographic study in the UAE, Nisbett claimed that cultural events and establishments such as the Louvre cover the human rights abuses committed by the UAE. Nisbett also observes that beyond the human rights criticism, the art community both regional and western had opposed the Louvre Abu Dhabi project due to the lack of democracy and past human rights record of the UAE. Nisbett however observes that such criticism has not had an adverse effect till date because renowned artists continue to participate in the Louvre Abu Dhabi and the UAE is now increasingly being seen as an advanced regional cultural hub. Overall, it is clear that the Louvre Abu Dhabi allows the UAE to achieve greater cultural capital and influence in the world and hence greater soft power.
However, although the Louvre Abu Dhabi is a great success in cultural diplomacy, its consequences must be critically evaluated. Such initiatives may be more about ‘cultural imperialism’ than real forums for cultural exchange. By aligning with prestigious Western institutions, the UAE risks promoting a narrative that portrays it as a passive receiver of culture rather than an active provider. This dynamic has the potential to hide the UAE’s unique cultural narratives and rich local history. Furthermore, the combination of high-profile cultural ventures with the UAE’s human rights record calls into doubt the legitimacy of its soft power claims.
Tourism Events and Soft Power
Apart from developing arts and cultural attractions as a tool of soft power, the UAE has also worked to develop its soft power through mega tourism projects and attractions. In the past, these have included developing the world’s tallest skyscraper (Burj Khalifa) and the world’s largest mall. In November 2013, the UAE’s use of tourism to build soft power took a definitive turn as it was awarded the World Expo for 2020 (Engelland-Gay, 2023).[29] The World Expo is a major international event that has been hosted every five years since 2000 and at irregular intervals before that. The World Expo not only showcases the culture of the host country but also that of other nations and allows for significant cross-cultural exchange. After being awarded the Expo 2020, the Government of Dubai started undertaking extensive developmental work to build the various pavillions. Not only were famous architects involved but a plethora of facilities and supporting events were designed (AlBanna, 2020).[30] After the establishment of the Soft Power Council, the elements of cultural diplomacy and nation branding were further strengthend to serve the UAE’s soft power agenda. Engelland-Gay observes that the Expo 2020 served as a resounding success in strengthening the UAE’s soft power (Engelland-Gay, 2023).[31]
The UAE’s soft power agenda has mainly focused on promoting its image for tolerance, peace, and openness (Al Zaabi and Awamleh, 2019).[32] Much can be observed from the statement of H.H. Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed with respect to Expo 2020. After visiting the UAE pavillion itself in the Expo 2020 grounds, Sheikh Abdullah commented that “UAE will always be the land of opportunities, a center of tolerance, coexistence and cultural diversity, and a beacon of knowledge” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021).[33] The statement specifically reflects the image as a tolerant and diverse country that the UAE has been trying to build since the Soft Power Council was established. However, for the Expo 2020, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs led by Sheikh Abdullah went beyond just empty platitudes and actually made a significant achievement with respect to tolerance and peace. In Expo 2020, the UAE was able to ensure the participation of both Israel and Palestine pavillions (Engelland-Gay, 2023).[34] The participation of Israel was particularly promoted following the signing of the Abraham Accords. When Israel’s participation was announced, Palestine decided to rescind its participation, but the UAE was able to convince Palestine to participate too. The widespread participation in Expo 2020 by almost 200 countries illustrated the openness of the UAE culture and also gave an image of a tolerant and peaceful nation. Moreover, the success of the Expo 2020 in promoting the UAE’s soft power can be seen from the fact that the Expo had almost 25 million visits which was in line with past World Expos. Unlike the past expo hosts, however, the UAE had a far smaller domestic population and most of the visits were acquired through international visitors.
Research on the after-effects of Expo 2020 also significantly indicates that Expo 2020 had a significantly positive impact on the UAE’s soft power. The update by Brand Finance, which publishes the Global Soft Power Index, goes on to show how Expo 2020 improved the UAE’s soft power. The update by Brand Finance, which publishes the Global Soft Power Index, goes on to show how Expo 2020 improved the UAE’s soft power (Josem and Campos, 2023).[35] The publication noted that the UAE had moved into the top ten countries with respect to global soft power and two-thirds of the increase in soft power could be attributed to Expo 2020. Brand Finance further claimed that the brand value of the UAE had risen by almost $180 billion between 2022 and 2023, and Expo 2020 contributed 10% to the increase in brand value. Swiatek and Di Martino provide an assessment of why Expo 2020 apparently had a significant impact on the UAE’s soft power (Swiatek and Di Martino, 2023).[36] The researchers observe that a major factor that moderates the relationship between large-scale events and soft power is virtuosity. The term virtuosity is defined as “superiority of performance and capacity.” The researchers believe that when virtuosity exists, it leads to magnificence, and that subsequently makes people attracted to a nation internationally. The result is increased soft power. Concerning Expo 2020, the researchers argue that the state had developed intricate sub-events and a detailed built environment that exhibited extensive performance and capacity. As experiences and media coverage around Expo 2020 further highlighted virtuosity, the UAE’s soft power saw significant improvements. Overall, Expo 2020 was a resounding success in developing the UAE’s image as a tolerant commercial hub.
Sportswashing or Sports Promotion?
Gulf states, including the UAE, have become quite involved in making use of sports to improve their image. Taylor, Burdsey, and Jarvis observe that studies concerning the use of sports by the Gulf states to promote their soft power have been marked with claims of sportswashing (Taylor, Burdsey, and Jarvis, 2023).[37] The researchers defined sportswashing as “attempts predominantly – but certainly not exclusively – by authoritarian regimes to improve their tarnished international reputations, especially regarding human rights concerns, through sport.” Brannagan and Giulianotti, discussing the case of Qatar, argue that using sports to improve soft power can also lead to soft disempowerment as the scrutiny attracted could outweigh any potential soft power gains (Brannagan and Giulianotti, 2018).[38] Indeed, the 2022 World Cup in Qatar became a source of constant criticism for Qatar as it had to deal with constant reports of poor labor conditions and even labor deaths (Taylor, Burdsey, and Jarvis, 2023).[39] Just five days before the World Cup started, CNN published a lengthy article interviewing migrant labor which criticized Qatar’s labor practices (Lewis, Acharya, and Pokharel, 2022).[40] Half way through the World Cup, Time Magazine published an article on migrant deaths due to stadium construction projects (Syed, 2022).[41] Whereas Qatar had expected to boost its image from hosting a global sporting event, the World Cup had the opposing effect of weakening Qatar’s soft power.
Has the UAE with its sports investment seen the same soft disempowerment? The answer based on research is no. Over the last decade and a half, the UAE has sought to promote its image via sports in three ways: (1) sponsorships, (2) direct investment (ownership), and (3) sports events. The first and the earliest method was through sponsoring popular teams in popular foreign sports. For instance, the UAE-based airline Emirates has been sponsoring the shirts of renowned soccer clubs such as Arsenal and Real Madrid for more than a decade (Krzyzaniak, 2018).[42] UAE-based firms are also the sponsors of many state-owned football teams, such as Manchester City (Godinho, 2020).[43] UAE companies have also invested in other sports ventures, such as Formula 1, cycling, golf, tennis, and rugby. Krzyzaniak has specifically evaluated the use of social sponsorships and its impact on the UAE’s soft power (Krzyzaniak, 2018).[44] The researcher found that sports sponsorships have not only boosted the UAE’s image in foreign states but also improved awareness about UAE brands abroad. Hence, sports sponsorship have not resulted in any soft disempowerment for the UAE.
Besides sponsorships, the UAE has also made direct investments in various sports by buying already existing teams or setting up new teams in their entirety. The most prominent amongst these is Manchester City which was bought for £400 million in 2008 (Dubinsky, 2023).[45] The UAE has also invested significantly in developing itself as a hub for yearly sports events. For instance, the UAE developed the Yas Island Track for the Abu Dhabi Grand Prix and it has developed many world-class golf and tennis facilities to host respective sports events (Bromber and Krawietz, 2013).[46] While the UAE has not received as much backlash to its yearly sporting events, the ownership of foreign sports team has been subject to criticism every now and then. For instance, the recent acquisition of a women’s cycling team was criticized based on the conditions of women’s rights in the UAE (Middle East Monitor, 2021).[47] The ownership of Manchester City is constantly been accused of financial doping and sports washing, but with the FIFA investigations everything was set clear (Conn, 2020).[48]
Whereas such criticism exists, there is a lack of studies with respect to whether the criticism has resulted in soft disempowerment or an increase in soft power. A casual assessment may be derived from whether there has been any decline in attendance to teams owned by the UAE. The data on attendance for Manchester City shows that attendance has increased since Abu Dhabi invested in the club (Transfermarkt, 2023).[49] A lot of this could be attributed to the fact that under the Abu Dhabi ownership, Manchester City has committed to a lot of community programs and is even working with the local city council to develop infrastructure (Taylor, Burdsey, and Jarvis, 2023).[50] Indeed, one reason that the UAE has not seen a soft disempowerment as Qatar is that the UAE has actually addressed a lot of criticism with respect to human rights. The UAE has worked to improve labor rights, women’s rights, and even the overall rule of law (Antwi-Boateng and Alhashmi, 2022).[51]
Becoming a Center of Learning
The final manner in which the UAE has worked to improve its soft power is through hosting renowned international research and higher education institutions. In 2005, Joseph Nye, who coined the term of soft power, observed that higher education is a key component of developing soft power and perhaps the most important component of the US soft power (Nye, 2005).[52] Nye further observed when foreign students study in the United States, they not only get quality education but also a sense of American liberal values. Subsequently, when these students return to their home countries they are able to express a better view of US culture and policies. For instance, Nye quoted Secretary of State Collin Powell as having said “I can think of no more valuable asset to our country than the friendship of future world leaders who have been educated here” (Nye, 2005).[53] Indeed, another benefit of providing world-class education is that it allows future important people to potentially be influenced by the host country’s culture and values.
The UAE has always been aware of the significant soft power benefits of higher education. Saeed Mohammad Al Etar, the secretary-general of the Soft Power Council recently outright acknowledged the benefit of international students. Al Etar particularly said that “a third main pillar of UAE’s soft power is the rise of international students… experiencing local culture before returning home with a positive image” (Masudi, 2019).[54] The UAE has always worked to expand its repertoire of world-class higher education institutions. As of the date of the current paper, the UAE is host to campuses of New York University, Sorbonne University, INSEAD, Herriot-Watt University, University of Wollongong, London Business School, Michigan State University, and many more. In addition, the UAE has partnered with renowned universities to set up entirely new institutions, such as the work of Masdar with MIT to set up the Masdar Institute of Science and Technology, which has since merged into Khalifa University. The presence of international universities makes the UAE an important destination for individuals seeking international standards of higher education regionally.
The UAE’s investment in higher education as part of its soft power strategy illustrates its diverse approach. For instance, the partnership with New York University Abu Dhabi (NYUAD) serves not only to attract international students but also to facilitate cultural exchange. NYUAD’s emphasis on interdisciplinary studies and liberal arts education introduces students from various backgrounds to Emirati culture while encouraging local students to engage with diverse perspectives. However, the impact of such institutions extends beyond academia; they also play a crucial role in shaping the perceptions of future leaders and influencers who will return to their home countries with an appreciation for Emirati culture and values. This exchange, while beneficial, invites scrutiny regarding the inclusivity of these educational environments, particularly in light of cultural gaps between local and expatriate students. Assessing how well these institutions integrate Emirati culture within their curricula could further illuminate the complexities of cultural diplomacy in the region.
The presence of world-class higher education institutions in the the UAE have also provided salient economic and socio-political benefits. To begin with, the presence of international universities attracts a large number of international students to the UAE every year. Sengupta reports that almost 75,000 students come to the UAE every year for higher education (Sengupta, 2022).[55] Such a large number of foreign students not only provides a boost to the UAE economy but also leads to deep cultural exchange. The cultural exchange further intensifies the appeal of the UAE to influence future decisions made by these foreiign students. In this case, the UAE is increasingly becoming similar to the USA which has influenced future leaders for decades as the home to renowned universities such as Harvard, Stanford and Yale. However, whereas the image of the UAE as a regional learning hub has definitely improved, problems still persist. For starters, the local population cannot afford many of the foreign universities (Jose and Chacko, 2017).[56] The majority opts to pursue higher education via the government-run universities, such as the Higher Colleges of Technology. There are also issues of cultural gap between locals and expatriates. As a student at one of the leading private universities, the general observation is that people mingle with the same ethnic grouping rather than in diverse groups. Regardless of the limitations and adverse local effects, the information concerning higher international student attendance in the UAE’s higher education investments illustrate a positive impact on soft power.
Conclusion
The paper provides an in-depth analysis of the UAE’s cultural diplomacy and tourism initiatives to boost its soft power. The paper mainly finds that the UAE’s use of art, tourism, sports and education initiatives have improved its soft power via enhancing its image and influence. The subsequent effect on soft power has been generally positive. However, in using cultural diplomacy tools to boost soft power, several risks have also been observed. The use of Louvre identity by Abu Dhabi was criticized by regional and international art community. The use of sporting events is seen to place significant criticism on a country’s human rights record. Nevertheless, the UAE appears to navigating the waters of cultural diplomacy and soft power quite nimbly to maximize the benefits and mitigate the adverse consequences. The case of Expo 2020 best illustrates how well the UAE is using tourism events to promote soft power. Thus, the findings underscore the significance of a balanced strategy to cultural diplomacy that prioritizes real cultural representation and participation with strategic soft power objectives. As the UAE refines its cultural diplomacy efforts, it must address critiques and ensure that its initiatives represent the different narratives of its community. By doing so, the UAE may strengthen its position as a prominent participant in global cultural diplomacy, creating a model for other countries looking to boost their own soft power in an increasingly interconnected world. For other nations aspiring to develop their own soft power a small state, the UAE provides an appropriate case study.
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[21] Btihaj Ajana, “Branding, Legitimation and the Power of Museums: The Case of the Louvre Abu Dhabi,” Museum and Society 13, no. 3 (2015): 322-341, https://doi.org/10.29311/mas.v13i3.333.
[22] Jan De Corte, “Piercing the Cultural Diplomacy Veil: The Case of the Louvre Abu Dhabi” (July 1, 2019), University of Antwerp, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3733447.
[23] James Langtown, “Louvre Abu Dhabi: Museum where ‘East meets West’ opens to the world,” The National, November 9, 2017, https://www.thenationalnews.com/uae/louvre-abu-dhabi-museum-where-east-meets-west-opens-to-the-world-1.674207.
[24] De Corte, “Piercing the Cultural Diplomacy Veil”.
[25] Rehab Sharaf Eldean, “The Role of Contemporary Universal Museums in Establishing a Dialogue Between Different Cultures: Louvre-Abu Dhabi Museum as an Example in the Arab World,” Journal of Tourism Research 26 (June 2021): 66-86.
[26] Ajana, “Branding, Legitimation and the Power of Museums”, 325.
[27] Lina Nardone, “The Soft Power of Big Art” (master’s diss., Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, 2018), http://dspace.unive.it/bitstream/handle/10579/14837/988911-1220065.pdf?sequence=2.
[28] Melissa Nisbett, “Can soft power be bought and why does it matter?,” Arts & International Affairs (2021), https://doi.org/10.18278/aia.5.2.4.
[29] Engelland-Gay, “Expo 2020, Cultural Diplomacy”, 27-28.
[30] Mohammad AlBanna, “The Effects of Soft Power Initiatives on the UAE’s Bilateral Relations” (master’s thesis, Khalifa University, 2020), https://khalifauniversity.elsevierpure.com/ws/portalfiles/portal/6821683/file.
[31] Engelland-Gay, “Expo 2020, Cultural Diplomacy”, 59-61.
[32] Fatima Al Zaabi and Raed Awamleh, “Determinants of Soft Power: The Case of United Arab Emirates,” Future Governments 7 (2019): 57-74, https://doi.org/10.1108/S2048-757620190000007004.
[33] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Expo 2020 Dubai will foresee future full of opportunities: H.H. Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed,’ July 7, 2021, https://www.mofa.gov.ae/en/mediahub/news/2021/7/7/07-07-2021-uae-minister.
[34] Engelland-Gay, “Expo 2020, Cultural Diplomacy”, 27-28.
[35] Michael Josem and Cristina Campos, “Expo 2020 Dubai biggest driver as UAE jumps five places in Brand Finance Global Soft Power Index 2023,” Brand Finance, April 17, 2023, https://brandfinance.com/press-releases/expo-2020-dubai-biggest-driver-as-uae-jumps-five-places-in-brand-finance-global-soft-power-index-2023
[36] Lukasz Swiatek and Luigi Di Martino, “Large-scale events and soft power,” in The Routledge Handbook of Soft Power, edited by Naren J. Chitty, Li Ji, and Gary D. Rawnsley (London: Routledge, 2023).
[37] Tom Taylor, Daniel Burdsey, and Nigel Jarvis, “A Critical Review on Sport and the Arabian Peninsula–The Current State of Play and Future Directions,” International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics 15, no. 2 (2023): 367-383.
[38] Paul Michael Brannagan and Richard Giulianotti, “The soft power–soft disempowerment nexus: the case of Qatar.” International Affairs 94, no. 5 (2018): 1139-1157.
[39] Taylor, Burdsey, and Jarvis, “A Critical Review on Sport,” 368-371.
[40] Aimee Lewis, Pramod Acharya, and Sugam Pokharel, “‘Our dreams never came true.’ These men helped build Qatar’s World Cup, now they are struggling to survive,” CNN, November 17, 2022, https://edition.cnn.com/2022/11/17/football/qatar-2022-world-cup-migrant-workers-human-rights-spt-intl/index.html.
[41] Armani Syed, “Why We May Never Know How Many Migrants Died Erecting the Qatar World Cup,” Time Magazine, December 2, 2022, 5:38 AM EST, https://time.com/6237677/qatar-migrant-deaths-world-cup/.
[42] John S. Krzyzaniak, “The Soft Power Strategy of Soccer Sponsorships,” Soccer & Society 19, no. 4 (2018): 498-515.
[43] Varun Godinho, “Inside the Business of Sports Sponsorship in the UAE,” Gulf Business, December 6, 2020, https://gulfbusiness.com/inside-the-business-of-sports-sponsorship-in-the-uae/.
[44] Krzyzaniak, “The Soft Power Strategy of Soccer Sponsorships,” 499.
[45] Yoav Dubinsky, Nation Branding and Sports Diplomacy: Country Image Games in Times of Change (Cham: Springer Nature, 2023), 131-135.
[46] Katrin Bromber and Birgit Krawietz, “The United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Bahrain as a Modern Sport Hub,” in Sport across Asia: Politics, Cultures, and Identities, ed. Katrin Bromber, Birgit Krawietz, and Joseph Maguire (New York: Routledge, 2013), 191-194.
[47] “Human Rights Group Slams UAE over Acquisition of Women’s Cycling Team,” Middle East Monitor, October 17, 2021, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20211017-human-rights-group-slams-uae-over-acquisition-of-womens-cycling-team/.
[48] David Conn, “Manchester City’s Champions League ban lifted by court of arbitration for sport,” The Guardian, July 13, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/football/2020/jul/13/manchester-city-champions-league-ban-lifted-cas-court-of-arbitration-for-sport.
[49] “Development of Visitor Numbers,” Transfermarkt, 2023, https://www.transfermarkt.com/manchester-city/besucherzahlenentwicklung/verein/281.
[50] Taylor, Burdsey, and Jarvis, “A Critical Review on Sport,” 375.
[51] Antwi-Boateng and Alhashmi, “The emergence of the United Arab Emirates,” 222-225.
[52] Joseph Nye, “Soft power and higher education,” In Forum for the Future of Higher Education, pp. 11-14. 2005. https://www.academia.edu/download/36246953/soft_power_university.pdf
[53] Nye, “Soft power and higher education,” 13.
[54] Faisal Masudi, “UAE Governance, Aid and Education Wield Soft Power Worldwide,” Gulf News, March 21, 2019, https://gulfnews.com/uae/uae-governance-aid-and-education-wield-soft-power-worldwide-1.62810342.
[55] Joydeep Sengupta, “Why the UAE is Attracting More Foreign Students than Ever Before,” Khaleej Times, 12 Apr 2022, https://www.khaleejtimes.com/education/why-the-uae-is-attracting-more-foreign-students-than-ever-before.
[56] Saju Jose and Jacob Chacko, “Building a Sustainable Higher Education Sector in the UAE,” International Journal of Educational Management 31, no. 6 (2017): 752-765.
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